FROM THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER.

The *extraordinary delay* of the Marquis Wellesley in answering the letter of Mr. Pinkney, *proves* the British ministry to have been governed by events in their occurrence posterior to the dismission of Mr. Jackson. Had they, as they should have been exclusively influenced by that act, with the circumstances that led to it, no reason for delay could have existed. The case was too plain and insolated to embarrass the most ordinary judgment. The facts were amply stated by both parties.——The wide field of antecedent negociation on the complicated affairs of the two nations in this instance presented no obstacle, and Mr. Jackson was at least as [illegible]ly heard as our government. The re[illegible]itions on our part were few and sim[illegible], and called for dispatch. In such a state of things the reflection of a day was as good as that of a month, and the judgment must have been as ripe for decision as it ever could be. A prompt compliance with our requests would have been no less honorable to the British government, than promotive of the best interests of the nation it represented. It would have revived the waning good will of the two nations, and produced, certainly in this country, a zealous disposition to yield much for the sake of an entire restoration of harmony. On the other hand, that government must have been sensible that a reluctant and tardy acquiescence in our demands, would assume more the air of policy than of justice, of compulsion than of a spontaneous disposition to do what was right. Such must have been the feeling of the British government had it considered our requisitions reasonable. On the contrary, had it viewed them as unreasonable the obligation was equally strong to give an immediate answer, that we might be enabled to form an unambiguous estimate of its disposition, and pursue measures dictated by the actual state of things, instead of being bewildered in the inextricable mazes of doubt and mystery. The demand made by us, indeed, so loudly called for a speedy decision, that the annals of diplomacy may be ransacked in vain without finding an analogous case attended with such delay, even in those dark periods when force was the acknowledged arbiter between nations. At this day such a delay would not have been tolerated by any European government, which would, long before it elapsed, have done itself justice by dismissing the offending minister. England herself would most unquestionably have pursued this course.

The delay, then, was unequivocally the result of circumstances foreign from the original case. These were, either—

1. The existing state of parties in England:

2. The political divisions among us; or,

3. The line of policy of France towards us.

Separately, or collectively, these causes dictated the stately and measured answer of the Marquis Wellesley.

1. We know that the present English ministry tottered to dissolution at the very moment it drew its first breath, and that it has ever since been exposed to the severest paroxysms, of which Parliament has been the theatre. In this state of mixed infancy and dotage it, was all important to avoid any thing like a rupture with America. In the midst of a wide-spread defeat and discomfiture of the British arms, when every ray of hope was quenched in the fatal bogs of Walcheren, and the right arm of British power paralised by the rapid disappearance of specie and the consequent depreciation of the paper currency, when added to all this, so great was the demand for grain, as to have rendered necessary the licencing of vessels trading to France, which at one time amounted to above five hundred lying in the Thames, it *was not politic* to add to her enemies or increase her difficulties. The non-intercourse with her was still in, at least nominal, existence, and might be enforced; at any rate, the apprehension of such an event might have thrown a weight into the adverse scale, which, added to that already in it, might have been fatal to the reigning party. Hence the importance of assuming the air of great candor, and of a resolute spirit of concilation towards this country, a spirit that would, in the activity of its zeal, extract good from evil. In the mean time, the session of Parliament was passing away, the ministry were pluming themselves on the amicable relations with this country and gaining no mean accession of strength from the reputation; Mr. Pinkney was, with unsuspicious, and even injudicious, eloquence, panegyrising the ministry, and, perhaps, more than all, the impression was sent across the channel that America and England were soon to be the best friends—thus awaking the jealousy, if not active hostility of France towards us, for causes which had no existence. Even on the 5th of April, twenty two days after the delivery of lord Wellesley's answer, we find the British prints, ministerial as well as others, exulting in the prospect of an accomodation and even treaty between the two nations; nay, the treaty itself is said to have gone out.*—In this expectation the British Parliament will in all probability ere this have adjourned, and under the same expectation the good people of England, in all likelihood, will for months to come, be gaping for the returned treaty—an expectation which will gain strength from the removal, instead of enforcement, of our non-intercourse, which they will not fail to ascribe to the confidential good understanding between the respective governments.

2. *Our political divisions* have eminently fostered, if not imperatively dictated, the conduct of Britain towards us. So long as we presented a united front, while the spirit of faction slept or feared to raise its head, so long as the loud burst of indignation resounded through the country, and so long as the representatives of the people appeared to uphold, with unhesitating resolution the course taken by the executive, the British government exhibited every disposition to do us full justice, not merely in this case, but in all others. Attend to dates and contemporaneous events, and mark the effects.

Mr Pinkney received his despatches on the 27th of November, and on the Saturday following had a conference with the Marquis Wellesley, in the course of which he explained to him fully the grounds upon which he was instructed to request Mr. Jackson's *immediate* recal." Lord Wellesley's reception "was frank and friendly;" and he left him "with a persuasion that we should have no cause to be dissatisfied with the final course of his government." At this time we appeared to be united. Most of the federal presses espoused the side of the government. Only two or three formed an exception to this honorable spirit. This state of things remained unaltered until more than a month after the meeting of Congress, when the proceedings in the Senate held out the flattering prospect of an almost unanimous support of the President by both Houses; and, under this impression Mr. Pinkney on the 2d of January presented his letter to Lord Wellesley, whose immediate answer was expected. Had the answer been promptly made, there is the strongest reason to believe that its tenor would have been very different from that given ten weeks afterwards; it is probable, that it would have officially admitted Mr. Jackson to have been in the wrong, announced his immediate recal, and named a successor of rank and talents actually substituted in his stead; connected with the expression of an ardent hope that all existing differences might be settled without delay by Lord Wellesley and Mr. Pinkney, under the assurance of the former that he was not wedded to any set of men or to any particular doctrines.

But, unfortunately, while the pen of the noble Marquis was probably engaged in drawing up such a note, intelligence was quickly conveyed across the Atlantic, that chilled the warm current that flowed fresh from his heart, and afterwards gave it a contrary direction. Party had again raised her hydra head in this country, and through the channels of communication with the British government, held out the hope, that she would be able to carry every thing before her†. Averse to yielding more than was requisite to gaining their ends, the ministry hesitated to take any decisive steps, resolving in the interim to watch events. This indecision, no doubt, emboldened the enemies of this country, as well in as out of the cabinet. For if the ends of Britain were to be attained, in consequence of our divisions, without making any concessions on her part, or abandoning the ground she had taken, it is easy to calculate the odium that would have been cast upon men, who had resolutely formed a treaty of reciprocal stipulations, involving important sacrifices, which, however just, could not fail at once to shock powerful prejudices and to wound the national sensibility. This pause proved fatal; every arrival from this country painted in glowing, and probably exaggerated colors, our divisions, and the increasing very little *positive* depends upon our selves. Yet a negative wisdom is left strength of the opposition, until the conviction was produced that not only no effectual measures would be taken to resist the aggressions on our maritime rights, but that even the existing measures, inadequate as they were, would most probably be abandoned. Such, we have no doubt, was the purport, and such the effect of the intelligence sent from this country about the beginning of February.

3. Lastly, the line of policy pursued by France towards us may have had no inconsiderable influence on the conduct the British government. The steady object of each of these powers is to embroil us with the other. If, consequently, we would agree to make war upon France, England would revoke her orders in council; or, if we would make war upon England, France would rescind her edicts. As this appears to be the end at which they aim, so nothing short of it would seem to satisfy them. This makes each government jealous of the least aspect of our conciliation with the other, and studious to take steps to aver it. Accordingly, when, on the dismission of Mr. Jackson, there were strong indications, manifested by France, of a disposition to revoke, or essentially modify her decrees, under the impression, perhaps, of a serious rupture between us and England, the British ministry may have deemed it good policy to lower their ordinary tone to us, and to give us and France to understand, that the dismission of Jackson, so far from impeding, would be converted into the means of accelerating the complete adjustment of our differences; calculating that this would have the effect of cooling the amicable feelings of France towards us, and of inducing her to wait the issue of our depending negociation with Britain. The fact is that the disposition of the French government shortly after underwent a considerable change, and that a period was put to the relaxation of her edicts. Had that government, on the other hand, assumed either the attitude of hostility, or marked friendship, towards us, it is highly probable that Britain would have seen it to have been her policy to grant us without delay all we asked.

* "It is generally believed," says the Courier of March 28, fourteen days subsequent to the date of the Marquis Wellesley's answer—"That a project of an arrangement between this country and the United States has been agreed on with Mr. Pinkney, and that it has gone on to America in the John Adams."

† Take the following extract from a London print published in March, as an evidence of the effect of our divisions on the public sentiment in England.

"American papers arrived in town yesterday.

The question on the comparative disadvantages of war with Great Britain and France, has occasioned much discussion in Congress, and indeed throughout the United States; and we are happy to find a more just disposition to appreciate the consequences of a war with this country, than has hitherto been displayed in America, begins to be prevalent. *The resolutions of the local legislature of Massachusetts, on the dismissal of Mr. Jackson, refer to this subject, and cannot fail, we should hope, to make a due impression on every sober minded man in the United States.*"

Cursory Thoughts on Public Affairs.

Individuals and nations are are obliged to act their parts on the great theatre of the world, according to their powers and their conditions. Times and circumstances impose effective laws on private men and public bodies, and never have times and circumstances been more imperious than in the latter stages of the short, but eventful existence of the United States. Much as we have suffered, however, and many and great as have been our recent trials, they sink to nothing, in a fair comparison with the difficulties and the sufferings which alarm, convulse and lacerate *the old world.*

At the commencement of the last session of congress every true lover of our country—every wise and good man, was heard to enquire *what effectual measures to ameliorate the condition of the United States can our national legislature adopt?*

It was plain that much of the evils of the day arose from *a deadly quarrel among the great powers of Europe.* Remote, potent, respectively, beyond all example, by sea or by land, contending for the greatest objects in this lower world—convinced of our unshaken and unalterable neutrality—arrogating to themselves every thing by arms alone—the European belligerents left us no remedy but one, as bad as the disease—*war in the arms of one against the other.*

It seems to have been thought by the national legislature that this would have been *our worst course*, for no member ever moved a declaration of war against any power.

The people appear to be of the same opinion in every state.

The executive government seem to have considered no unequivocal war measure as worthy of a suggestion by them to the legislative body.

The continuance of our portions of army and navy, and of the preparations of arms, the support of public credit, the removal of those restraints on commerce, which were said to produce privations that would revolutionize our government, the exclusion of the marine armies of the principal belligerents from our ports, the provision for the exclusion from our trade of either power, which shall *continue* to aggress, as soon as the other shall *cease* to aggress.—These several things, small as they may be deemed by some, *are more than any other country has been willing and able to oppose to the aggressions of the two belligerents.* These eventful times—our deeply interesting case, require an attentive survey of the world—a calm consideration, and some rational course of action, or *that we should rest upon our arms, upon our sea board, and upon every margin of our country.* In a season so awful; in a case so deeply affecting, it is of no inconsiderable moment, that our state physicians do not too much—that they do nothing wrong. In a case wherein the world in arms presses on this young and minor country, to us. We may refrain from active folly, insanity and crime: from a war of mere lucre: a war of ambition: a war of plunder: a war of madness: a war of expence incalculable, and of hazards we cannot estimate: a war for commerce, costing more than its profits: a war of knight errantry, for the bubble reputation, to prove that we alone can oppose abroad the forces of Bonaparte, which Europe cannot oppose; and the navies of Britain, which the fleets of the civilized world are unable to subdue.—Each power *at war* trades with the other, as far as it can. This is a new state of things. Is it right then, or is wrong, that we also trade with each, as far as we can? It may be of some importance, if it were only to prove that our privations are not produced by our own laws and government. It will restore domestic harmony by rendering this truth manifest. It will appear to the mild, the sober minded, the cautious and the wealthy in Europe, that we have a disposition, a talent and a good fortune in our work of industry, economy and peace. We shall pursue commerce as far as we can; and we shall increase that vast aggregate of 120 millions in American manufactures, which the secretary of our trassury has recently exhibited to the government, the country and the world. We must perceive that we are not less prosperous than the most fortunate of the European states. Affected in our accustomed intercourse with foreign nations, we shall have more frequent intimate and beneficial intercourse with one another. Domestic resources will be developed and displayed. The estimate of the greatest manufactures of one nation of Europe in 1786, was sixty millions of pounds sterling. Ours at 120 millions of dollars, is equal to twenty-seven millions of sterling pounds.—It is a good estate which produces two per cent. net income beyond the maintenance of the family, the cattle, and all taxes, improvements and repairs. Our exports, sea stores and maintenance of foreigners here, may be taken at half a million of dollars per annum, giving at two per cent. profit, a capital in productive domestic property of three thousand millions of dollars, besides our public and private uncultivated lands, which are *a deferred stock* of incalculable magnitude. Americans! love one another: cultivate your interior: assist commerce: be ever ready to defend your altars and your fire sides: and gratefully confide in an over-ruling providence, so eminently good to our political family. *Ib.*

WASHINGTON CITY, MAY 28.

The information recently received from France, is of such a complexion as to give increased interest to the arrival of the John Adams. By her, it is probable, that a fuller, perhaps a conclusive, indication of the temper of the French government will be received. We shall then, probably, be enabled to decide, whether, bad as the existing state of things with her is, the prospect is not that they will grow worse rather than better; and whether the time is not at hand when every American vessel, entering the ports of the continent of Europe, will be condemned; whether, in fact, any trade to the continent can be carried on with safety. We would not wish to paint the dangers of the commercial world in exaggerated colors;—but, it is a truth, which neither can or ought to be disguised, that the whole foreign horizon lowers with dangers. The numerous private letters, received from every part of Europe under the cotrol of Bonaparte, corroborate the tenor of the official documents in our last paper, and are commentaries, which cannot be mistaken, on the note of the Duc de Cadore. Our vessels are every where seized, not by the municipal authority, or conformably to the usual forms of judicial proceedings; but by the strong arm of military power; not in detail but in mass.——A general condemnation follows, and by one tremendious sweep millions are carried into the public coffers. In many ports all this is done, not merely without notice, but in direct violation of solemn assurances of protection; and, from Denmark, unfortunate Denmark! we are threatened with the lawless depredations of a swarm of privateers.

Such are the outrages committed on our rights, which, it would seem, flow from the mandates of the French government, contemporaneous with the note of the Duc de Cadore. What prospect there is of being relieved from them may be best ascertained from the note itself. This paper, it will be observed, is no light or hasty exposition of the sentiments of the French government. It purports to be a *written* answer given to the verbal overtures of our minister, "that the President of the United States may the better know the *friendly intentions* of France towards the United States, and her *favorable dispositions* to American commerce." It is consequently written to prevent all mistake, and we might, perhaps, add to silence all hope of any change for the better.

"If then" says the note, after going into some detail, "the minister of America can enter into an engagement, that the American vessels will not submit to orders in council of England of November 1807, nor to any decree of blockade, unless this blockade should be real, the undersigned is authorised to conclude every species of convention tending to renew the treaty of commerce with America, and in which all the measures proper to consolidate the commerce and the prosperity of the Americans shall be provided for."

The only construction that can be put upon this language, is, that if America will actually make war upon England, France will make a treaty with her.—For France knows, that, short of going to war, we have done every thing to resist the British orders in council and proclamation blockades; that we have imposed an embargo, passed a non-intercourse law, and prohibited English armed vessels from entering our waters; and that we have offered to her, to continue the two last prohibitions so far as they affected England, if she would rescind her edicts. More than this could not have been done, unless we had actually made war on England. This, then, is the end at which France aims; and this her *sine qua non* for respecting our rights. And because we do not take this step at her dictation, we are reproached with a want of "just political views, of honor and of energy." The blood that was spilt in atchieving our liberties is called up in judgment against us, and we are told that we "ought either to tear to pieces the act of our independence, and to become again, as before the revolution, the subjects of England, or to take such measures as that our commerce and industry should not be tarriffed by the English, which renders us more dependent than Jamaica, which at least has its asssembly of representatives and its privileges!"

But, suppose it possible that we could be so base, as, at the mandate of any foreign government, to be driven into war with its enemy, what would be the effects? The trade with England, we all know, would be lost. Is it certain that we should retain that of the continent, as our indemnity? So far from this being certain, is it not most likely, that France would then impose the same restrictions on our trade to the continent that she now does upon that of her allies; prohibit it altogether, or only so far authorise it as comported with her own interest?

For our own part, we do not hesitate to say that the time has come, when every patriotic or prudent man among us should cease to flatter himself with justice, much less friendship, from either of the belligerents; when the government should take firm and permanent groud; and the people, by their industry and enterprise, make themselves independent of Europe. England and France have both the same object in view. In the fury of their animosity against each other, they are totally regardless of the rights of neutrals; and if they possess the power, they will not leave a neutral plank on the ocean.

Although the retrospect is fruitful of painful feeling, we are irresistibly carried back to the proud and commanding attitude in which the Embargo, that much abused measure, placed us. Not a day passes, without confirming its wisdom, and illustrating the penetration and foresight of the illustrious character that recommended it. It was worthy of him, who had so splendid an agency in atchieving our independence, to interpose this shield for its protection against new and fearful perils.—However, amidst the squabbles of party, its policy may be questioned, and the motives of its authors vilified, when the petty feuds of the day are forgotten it will receive the award of an unprejudiced posterity.

But the embargo and non intercourse are gone, and our merchants are now left to manage their concerns in their own way. If then a wide spread ruin overwhelm them, let them not complain of their government; the fault will be their own, and they must submit to it without murmur. They have rejected every salutary restraint imposed upon them; they have demanded a perfect freedom. They now have their wish. We shall rejoice, if this freedom adds to their prosperity, and much more so, if it conduces to the prosperity of the nation. The gratification will be the livelier from its being unexpected.

Having received information that several vessels had been fitted and armed within the waters of the United States, with intent to cruise against the subjects of a foreign prince with whom the U. States are at peace, government has issued instructions to institute prosecutions against all persons whatever who may have been or shall hereafter be concerned in the fitting out and arming of any such vessel or in the augmenting of the force of any such vessel.—(*Nat. Intel.*)

The number of marriages throughout the Russian empire was, last year, according to an authenticated return, 288,788; births, 2,334,500; and [illegible] 886,084.