Eastern Shore REPUBLICAN STAR OR General Advertiser.

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THE TERMS OF THE STAR,

Are *Two Dollars and Fifty Cents* per annum, payable half yearly, in advance: No paper can be discontinued until the same is paid for.

Advertisements are inserted three weeks for *One Dollar*, and continued weekly for *Twenty-Five Cents* per square.

PUBLIC SALE.

Will be offered at public sale on WEDNESDAY the 7th day of April next, if fair, if not, the next fair day, at the late dwelling of *James Dudley*, dec'd—the personal property of the said dec'd. consisting of Horses, Cattle, Sheep, Hogs, Farming Utensils, Household and Kitchen Furniture, &c. A credit of six months will given on all sums over 6 dollars, the purchaser giving note with approved security, before the removal of the property; for all sums under six dollars, the cash will be required. The sale to commence at ten o'clock.

ELIZABETH DUDLEY, Ext'x.
JOHN DUDLEY, Ex'or.

march 23——3

Public Sale.

Will be offered at public sale, at the late dwelling of *Elijah Spence*, (in Landing Neck) dec'd. on Thursday the 8th day of April next, if fair, if not, the next fair day, on a credit of six months—All the personal property of said deceased, consisting of a valuable stock of horses, sheep, cattle and hogs, household and kitchen furniture; also a quantity of Indian corn and blades—On all sums of five dollars and upwards, notes with approved security will be taken: on all sums under, the cash will be required. Further particulars made known on the day of sale, and attendance given by

JAMES CAIN, Adm'r
of Elijah Spence, dec'd.

march 30——2

N. B. The crop of Wheat, of sixty bushels seeding, with the lease of the Farm for the present year, will be sold at the same time, on the above terms. JAMES CAIN, Adm'r.

PUBLIC SALE.

The Vestry of St. Michael's Parish will offer for sale, to the highest bidder, on the first Tuesday in May next, at Mr. Peacock's tavern at Easton (12 o'clock)—all that Land belonging to the said Vestry, on the road from Easton to Potts's Mill, called "Mill Road" and "Mill Road Addition" The quantity of Land not exactly known at this time; supposed about sixty acres. It is situated two miles from Easton, and will be a great object as a source of wood and timber.

march 9——9

FOR SALE.

That valuable estate, in Tuckahoe, some time since conveyed to me in trust, by Mr. William Roberts, containing about one thousand acres.—It will be sold on a reasonable credit, in two parcels; one parcel of about 400 acres, including the principal mansion, and another of about 600 acres, being the farm commonly called *Tilbury*.—If this estate be not disposed of at private sale, it will be sold by auction on WEDNESDAY the 19th day of May, on the premises, upon terms which may be known by a previous application to the subscriber.

The subscriber requests that the *judgment* creditors of Mr. Roberts will meet at the court house, in Easton, on Monday, the 3d day of May next, at 10 o'clock, A. M.

JOHN L. KERR.

Easton, march 16——10

From the London Pilot of Jan. 13.

Among all the painful reflections arising from the circumstances and consequences of the recent naval conflicts with the Americans, nothing is so afflicting as the unquestionable fact, that the losses and sufferings of the Americans in the several actions, bore no proportion to ours. It has never before been known, that in an engagement in which the strength of the parties was so nearly proportioned as to require or admit an engagement, the loss was so disproportionate on the conqueror's part; nor does this observation apply merely to the case of a Spaniard. The great advantage and the great distinguishing characteristic of British gallantry, has also been, that infinitely more damage and more loss was inflicted on the enemy than was sustained on our part.—But, unhappily, the case is altogether reversed.—We suffer losses equal, if not superior, to what our former enemies have sustained in the most memorable of naval combats of prior wars; and our enemies suffer less than has been suffered by us in the most brilliant of our victories. Here, then, is the most serious and lamentable circumstance of the late unfortunate conflicts between British and American frigates; not merely that the British frigates were conquered and captured, inflicting so little comparative injury upon their opponents, and suffering so much comparatively themselves. We do not think, as we have said, that even a Spanish frigate of the same relative force has been taken by a British one, without having left a better memorial of her name, her strength and her opponent. Let us not be accused here of disregard for our country's feelings, or want of attachment to our country's glory.—No solid wisdom, no real patriotism can exist distinct from truth. We must dare to look facts, however humiliating they may be, boldly in the face. For, unless we contemplate them, in their full extent—unless we adequately felt the impression that they should make on our minds, they can never produce that rebound of sentiment and effort which is necessary to replace us in the proud eminence on which we heretofore stood—The fact is, that we have suffered most severe loss, without having inflicted any corresponding injury on our opponents. Let the nation think of this—let the navy think of this—combining in every future conflict with the Americans, Nelson's pithy instruction—"England expects every man to do his duty"—and if we are to hear again of English ships captured by Americans, at least we hope to hear of them without the disgrace of knowing that 100 or more suffered on our side, when their loss was limitted to ten or a dozen.—Again, it is to be observed, that in former engagements we had such superior facilities in the management of our ships and our artillery, that we discharged three shots for every one discharged on the part of our antagonist; but now the Americans boast of having discharged three to every one of our's in the action between the United States and Macedonian, and unfortunately the disparity of the loss bears testimony to the truth of the allegation. Here, again, is a fact to pause upon, and a pressing occasion for resollecting the admonition of Nelson—"England expects every man to do his duty."

It may not be amiss here to subjoin, by way of memorandum, a statement of the actual loss on both sides in the several actions.

The Macedonian lost in the action with the United States, 36 killed, 36 severely and 32 slightly wounded. The loss of the United States, in the same action, was but 5 killed and 9 wounded, two of them mortally.

In the action between the Wasp and the Frolic, the former had only 5 killed and 5 wounded. Capt. Whinyates, of the Frolic, has not given a list of the loss on board that vessel; but we find that capt Jones, of the Wasp, in his letter, inserted in this paper, states, from what was seen by lieut. Biddle, whom he put on board as prize master, and from what that officer collected in conversation with the officers of the Frolic, that she had about 30 killed and 40 or 50 wounded.

The action between the Guerriere and the Constitution was fought for the greatest part at a distance, and was perhaps of superior manœuvre rather than superior valor on the side of the Americans. Capt. Dacres surrendered on account of the disabled and sinking condition of his ship, which the captors themselves were obliged to destroy the day after the engagement. The difference of loss was, therefore, not so great in the number of killed in this instance as in the two others; yet here also the advantage was also on the side of the Americans; for we find that the Constitution had only 7 killed and as many wounded, and the Guerriere 15 killed and sixty-four wounded.

These facts are unpleasant; but bitter as the reflections they are calculated to excite must be, it is not safe that we should exclude from our minds any part of the impressions that they are naturally calculated to make; for the more acute and constant the pain that they excite, the more certain, the more near, the more vigorous & effectual the efforts, which we trust and are sure they will produce, to restore to us our former proud and enviable superiority. Above all, we trust, that the ever memorable sentence, which we have already cited, will be kept in mind in every succeeding action—and that every seaman in the British service will recollect that "England expects every man to do his duty."

From the London Times of Jan. 6.

Whatever insensibility the friends of ministers may affect, with regard to the triumphs of the American navy, they are abundantly anxious to retort upon them, in the way of rumor and report. Not a day passes, without some asserted capture by our cruizers, to which though we lend a most willing ear, we have hitherto unfortunately found no sufficient reason to attach entire credit. Yesterday was more than usually prolific of these air drawn victories. A morning paper gratified us with assurances of the capture of the United States and recapture of the Macedonian; but an evening paper went still farther, and noticed the reported surrender of commodore Rogers and his whole squadron! Most happy should we have been to find either of these reports correct. It is high time that something should be done, to recall to the memory of our brave tars the sentiments which were once universal among our countrymen, and which inspired the patriotic hymn of "Britannia rules the waves."

Notwithstanding all that has been done to depress the courage and deaden the spirit of that gallant body of men, our naval heroes, by representing the striking of the British flag as a very natural occurrence—a mere accident—by analysing the constitution of a British crew, and proving it far inferior to an American one—by exaggerating the size and strength of the enemy's ships, and diminishing these of our own—by attempting to save the ministers from blame at the expense of the naval officers—notwithstanding all these, and a thousand other weak and despicable artifices, which have been exercised by the detenders of a weak and despicable policy, we still think that our navy, if it has but fair play given to it, will soon annihilate the boastful spirit of the Americans, and sweep from the seas the whole of that contemptible force which has been too long suffered to struggle for the sceptre of the ocean.

We have said, and we say again, that our censure is not directed against a partial misconduct, in the particular department which has the immediate disposal of our naval force. It is directed against the feebleness and timidity of that policy, which overrides the exertions of every department. Political cowardice alone, as we conceive, prevented ministers from commencing the war against America in the style which the Americans themselves expected. It prevented them from having a plan matured and ready, for falling upon the sea coast of America, blockading up her ports, hindering her privateers from sailing, and capturing and destroying every frigate she might dare to send to sea. These would have been vigorous measures, but not more vigorous than the ministers had ample means at that time to effect. They had, say their defenders, 85 sail to oppose to 14; then, say we, they had enough, and more than enough to have done all that we have described as necessary. If it was not done; the failure was not for the want of means, but for want of plan; and the plan, we have no doubt, would have been readily enough furnished by the proper department, if the cabinet had thought fit to call for it: but, in the words of an almost inspired statesman, "Littleness in object, and in means, to them appears soundness and sobriety." They, therefore, begin on all occasions, too low. They bring out the impatient "dogs of war" muzzled and clogged. What is the consequence? The enemy is animated. He obtains advantages.—His fire increases. The war drags on heavily; the expence augments daily. If we had 85 ships at first, we soon find it necessary to have 100.—If we hesitated to send a cruizing squadron to his coasts in the summer, we are obliged to place two stationary squadrons there in winter. If we tho't frigates but two thirds manned were strong enough, we presently discovered that we must cut down 74's, and increase the compliment of our ships of all classes. In short the exertions and expence from which we timidly shrink in the outset, must, in the progress of the contest, be more than double.

"*Si nolles, sanus, curres hydropicus.*"

We are prepared to hear these "words of soberness and truth," these topics, so repeatedly urged by a Demosthenes and a Burke, set down to the account of personal and interested motives. Our readers will need from us no disclaimer of such motives. They will look to the events of the last six months—to the mortifying retreat of the brave Wellington—to the triumphant audacity of the petty American marine—and say whether they are not enough to disgust and sadden those who know no party but their country.

FROM COBBETT'S REGISTER, OF JAN. 16, 1813.

AMERICAN STATES.

My two last numbers were devoted principally to the task of endeavoring to convince the Prince Regent and the public, that it was neither dangerous or dishonorable to yield to the terms upon which we might have had, and may yet have, peace with America; and, to my great mortification, though, I must confess, not much to my surprise, I now see, from the contents of the last Gazette, wherein is his royal highness's "*Declaration*," that all my endeavors have been of no avail, and that war, long, expensive and sanguinary war, will now take place with an enemy, who, above all others, is capable of inflicting deep wounds upon this already crippled, or, at least exhausted nation. From the first publication of the letters which passed between Lord Wellesley and Mr. Pinkney, soon after the French had announced their intention to repeal the Berlin and Milan decrees; from the very day of that publication, which took place soon after I was imprisoned in Newgate for two years (with a fine to THE KING, which I have since paid, of a thousand pounds) for having written and published upon the subject of flogging certain English militia-men, at the Town of Ely, in England, who had been first reduced to submission by German troops; from the very day of that publication I began to fear the present sad result of the dispute which had then assumed a new and more serious character than it had ever before worn.—With that fear in my mind, I bent all my feeble powers towards preventing such result. I have failed; opinions and counsels the direct opposite of mine have prevailed; and time will show who was right and who wrong. Upon former occasions the real grounds of war have, but too often, been lost sight of in the multitude and confusion of consequent events; the government had the address to enlist the passions of men on its side, & the voice of reason has been stifled. But, *here*, as I was from the first resolved it should be, there is a clear, a distinct, an undisguisable ground before our eyes; we know well what we are at war for: we know, and must bear in mind, that we are at war for the purpose of *enforcing our practice of stopping American vessels upon the high seas, and taking out of them all such persons as our naval officers may deem to be British seamen.* This is now become the clearly defined subject of the war with America. The "DECLARATION," which will be found below, inserted at full length, does not contain any *new* matter; it is a summary of what our ministers have before alledged & asserted in their correspondence with the American government and its divers agents. But, there are some few passages of it which require to be particularly noticed. The question relating to the Orders in Council has been before so amply discussed, in my several letters and articles upon the subject, that I will not encumber my present remarks with any thing relative thereunto; but, will confine myself to what relates to the impressment of persons out of American ships on the high seas.—Upon this point the "Declaration" says: "His "Royal Highness can never admit, that in the "exercise of the *undoubted* and hitherto *undisputed right of searching neutral merchant vessels in "time of war*, the impressment of British seamen, "when found therein, can be deemed *any violation of a neutral flag*. Neither can he admit, "that the taking such seamen from on board "such vessels, can be considered by any neutral "state as a hostile measure or a justifiable cause "of war. There is no right more clearly established, than the right which a sovereign has "to the allegiance of his subjects, more especially in time of war. Their allegiance is no optional duty, which they can decline, and resume "at pleasure. It is a call which they are bound "to obey: *it began with their birth, and can only "terminate with their existence.* If a similarity of "language and manners may make the exercise "of this right more liable to *partial mistakes*, and "*occasional abuse*, when practised towards the "vessels of the U. States, the same circumstances "make it also a right, with the exercise of which, "in regard to such vessels, it is more difficult to "dispense."

The doctrine of *allegiance*, as here laid down, I admit with some exceptions; but, as to the right of impressing British seamen, on the high seas, out of neutral ships, I deny it to be founded on *any* principle or maxim, laid down by *any* writer on public law. Indeed, the "DECLARATION" does say that SEARCHING neutral vessels in time of war is "*undoubted*" and has *hitherto been "undisputed.*" This is not correct; for, not only has even *this* right been doubted, not only are there two opinions about it in the books on public law, but the writers on public law are for the most part, *against* the said right *as we practise it*, and they contend that we have no right to seize enemy's goods on board of merchant ships which are neutral. Nay, the contest has given rise to military resistance on the part of our now-ally Russia, Denmark and Sweden; and, what is still more, G. Britain ceased, upon their *threats*, to exercise this, even *this* right of seizing *enemy's goods* on board of neutral ships of war.—But, this right; this right of SEARCHING neutral ships; what has it to do with the *impressment of persons* on board of such ships! That is what the Americans object to, and are at war against. They are not at war against our right of *search*, even in our own interpretation of that right. What they object to is, the stopping of their vessels on the high seas, & taking *people* out of them by force; a practice which, I repeat it, is sanctioned by no principle or maxim of any writer on public law, nor by any usage heretofore in the world. The "DECLARATION" does not assert, as Lord Castlereagh did in his letter to Mr. Russell, that this practice is sanctioned by any former usage; but it *declares* the right from the *right of search*. It says, that *in exercising* "the right of search," that is to say, the right of search for articles *contraband of war*, and for *enemy's goods*, we have a right to impress British seamen, if we find them. So that, this is the new shape of the defence of the practice: we do not now assert that we have a right to stop American vessels upon the high seas *for the purpose* of impressing our seamen; but having stopped them for the purpose of exercising our old "*right of search*," we have a right to avail ourselves of the opportunity to take out persons whom our own officers, at their discretion, may judge to be British seamen. This is not even *plausible*, in my opinion; for, what right can we have to impress, if we have no right to stop for the purpose of impressing? I may enter another's house to search for a stolen coat, and if I find there my hat, I may seize it as well as my coat, having due authority for the first; but be it observed, that to steal the hat was as criminal as to steal the coat; and if I had known or suspected, that the hat was there, I might have had a search warrant for the former as well as for the latter.

The law of nations calls the high seas the common right of nations. A ship there is a parcel of the State to which she belongs, & the sovereign rights of that State travel with her. The sole exception is, as has been before stated, the belligerents have a right to search neutrals for *goods of the enemy*, and for *warlike stores and troops* carrying for the enemy's use, because, as far as neutrals are engaged in such a service they are deemed to be *in the service of the enemy.*——In all other respects a neutral ship carries with her, on the high seas the rights of sovereignty appertaining to the State which she belongs. Now it is well known, that no nation has a right to enter the territory of another to exercise any authority whatever, much less that of seizing persons and carrying them away by force; and indeed, is it not fresh in every one's memory, what complaints were made against the French for entering the territory of the Elector of Baden and seizing the Duke of Enghein?—If we have a right to enter American ships on the high seas, and take out of them, by force of arms, British seamen, what should hinder us from having the same right as to any of the sea ports of America? Nay, why should we not go and seize our numerous manfacturers, who have been (contrary to our laws) carried to America with cloths and cutlery? Their alledging, that they went thither to avoid the effect of prosecutions for libel, or for some other of our state crimes, would be no bar to our claim upon them; and, in short, they could never be safe to the last moment of their lives. It is said that the seamen on board of American ships are *deserters*. Be it so. We may be sorry that they do desert; but it is no crime in the Americans that our sailors go into America. Is it not well known that numerous deserters from the Austrian and Prussian armies have, at all times, deserted in the nighbouring States; and is it not equally well known, that the neighboring State has invariably possessed the undisputed right of giving them protection, and of enlisting them in its service?——Why, therefore, should we deem it a crime in America, whose abundance of lands and provisions, whose high price of labour, and whose happiness to the lower order of mankind, hold out their arms to the whole world? And here I cannot help introducing a remark upon the proposition, made by Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Russell, that the American government should stipulate to *deliver up* all British seamen in the service of Americans. Mr. Russell is said to have expressed himself as having been *shocked* at this proposition, which has afforded an abundant theme of abuse of him by your hireling writers. But, I have no scruple to say, that I firmly believe, that it is a proposition that never was before made to any independent State; even to the most petty State of Germany. There was a plan, some years ago, in agitation amongst the States of Europe, for putting in force a mutual surrender of each other's subjects, whereupon the Abbe Raynal remarks, that, if it had gone into effect each of the several States might have taken the motto of *Dante* over the entrance to his *infernal regions*: He who enters here leaves even "*hope* behind." He represents it as the utmost stretch of tyranny; a point, he says, which the world ought to perish rather than reach.——And, therefore, though Lord Castlereagh's proposition did not go to this length; though it was confined to British seamen, we have no reason to abuse Mr. Russell for his expression.

It will be said, may be, that Mr. Russell was ordered to stipulate for the surrender on our part, of all American seamen. Aye, but the difference is, that Mr. Russell proposed those only who had been *impressed by us*; whereas we wanted to stipulate for the surrender of those British seamen who had gone into America of *their own free will.* We wanted to have surrendered to us, men who were employed in American merchant ships; they wanted us to surrender men whom we had seized in their ships, and forced into our *men of war.* But is it possible, that any one can find any thing to object to in a request, that as a *preliminary*, we should give up the Americans, whom we had impressed into our service? What is the state of those men, now in our service? What is their state? Has the reader reflected upon this? They must be useless on board of ship; they must not act; they must do no seamen's duty; or, they must, according to our own doctrine, lately exemplified at Horsemonger Lane, be TRAITORS, worthy of being hanged, ripped up, and cut in quarters. His Royal Highness's declaration says, that allegiance to his father and his successor begins with a man's birth and ends but with his death. And is it not the same with American citizens? Do they not owe similar allegiance to their country? Or is it about to be pretended, that none but Kings can claim this sort of allegiance? I do not think that any one, even of the writers in the Times & Courier, will have the impudence to set up this doctrine; but this they must do before they can make out any good ground of charge against the Americans for having demanded as a preliminary, the surrender of the impressed American seamen Capt Dacres, in accounting for the loss of his frigate, expressly states, that he had *many Americans on board*, whom he permitted to be spectators, from a reluctance to compel them to fight against their country. And, can the reader believe, that this was the only instance in which native Americans were unwillingly serving on board of British ships of war? What, then, I ask, must be the state of those Amaricans? And what are we to think of those writers, who abuse Mr. Russell for proposing to us their surrender as a step preliminary to any further arrangement?——The declaration complains, that America demanded the abandonment of the practice of impressment as a preliminary to her passing a law to prevent British seamen from being received on board her ships.—The hireling writers have treated this demand as something too insolent to be for a moment listened to. The "DECLARATION" does not treat it in this lofty style; but it speaks of it in pretty strong terms, as thus:—"The proposal of an armistice, and of a simultaneous repeal of the restrictive measures on both sides, subsequently made by the commanding officer of his majesty's naval forces on the American coast, were received in the same hostile spirit by the government of the U. States. The suspension of the practice of impressment was insisted upon in the correspondence which passed on that occasion, as a *necessary preliminary* to a cessation of hostilities. Negociation, it was stated, might take place without any suspension of the exercise of the right, and also without any armistice being concluded; but G. Britain was required *previously* to agree, without any knowledge of the adequacy of the system which could be substituted, to negociate upon the basis of *accepting the Legislative regulations of a foreign State*, the sole *equivalent* for the exercise of a right which *she has felt to be essential to the support of her maritime power.*"

Well, and what then? "*A right*" it is called again; but, if America *denied* it to be a right, as she has uniformly done, what wonder was there that she made the proposition? Great Britain might "*feel*," though I should have chosen the word "*deem*," as smacking less of the boarding school Miss's style; Great Britain might "*feel*," if feel she must, that the practice complained of was essential to the support of her maritime power; but, did it hence follow, that America, and that impressed Americans should like the practice the better for that? We have so long called ourselves the *deliverers* of the world, that we, at last, have fallen into the habit of squaring up all our ideas to that appellation; and seem surprised that there should be any nation in the world inclined to wish for a diminution of our power. The Americans, however, clearly appear to see the thing in another light. They, in their home spun way, call us any thing but *deliverers*; and it must be confessed, that, whatever may be our general propensity, we do not seem to have been in haste to deliver impressed American seamen.

That one nation ought not to yield *a right*, depending for compensation solely upon the legislative provisions of a foreign state, is very true; but, if the right be doubtful; if it be unsupported by any law, principle, maxim, or custom, then the case is different; and then, indeed, the offer of a legislative provision is a proof of sincere desire to accommodate. If my view of the matter be right, and I verily believe it is, this is the light in which that offer ought to be viewed; and I must deeply lament that it was not thus viewed by the ministers. These lamentations, however, are now useless. The sound of war is gone forth; statement & reasoning are exhausted: the sword is to decide whether England is, or is not, to impress, at the discretion of her naval officers, persons on board American merchant ships on the high seas. There is one passage more in the "DECLARATION," upon which I cannot refrain from submitting a remark or two. After stating that America has made only *feeble remonstrances* against the injuries she has received from *France*, the "DECLARATION," this "*memorable* document," as the Courier calls it, concludes thus: "This disposition of the Government of the U. States—this *complete subserviency to the Ruler of France*—this hostile temper towards G. Britain—are evident in almost every page of the official correspondence of the American with the French government. Against this course of conduct, the real cause of the present war, the Prince Regent solemnly protests. Whilst contending against France, in defence not only of the liberties of G. Britain, BUT OF THE WORLD, His Royal Highness was entitled to look for a far different result. From their *common origin*—from their *common interest*—from their *professed principles of freedom* and independence, the U. States were the last power, in which G. Britain could have expected to find a *willing instrument*, and *abetter of French tyranny.*—Disappointed in this just expectation, the Prince Regent will still pursue the policy which the British government has so long and invariably maintained in *repelling injustice*, and in supporting the general rights of nations; and, under the *favor of* PROVIDENCE, relying on the justice of his cause, and the tried loyalty and firmness of the British nation, his royal highness confidently looks forward to a successful issue of the contest, in which he has thus been compelled most reluctantly to engage." The last paragraph is in the old style, and will hardly fail to remind Mr. Madison of the documents of this kind, issued about *six and thirty years ago.*——However, the style is none the worse for being old; tho' one cannot but recollect the occasion upon which it was formerly used.

I regret, however, to find, in this solemn document, a distinct charge against the American government of "*subserviency to the Ruler of France*;" because, after a very attentive perusal of all the correspondence between the American and French governments, I do not find any thing, which, in my opinion, justified the charge. The truth is, that "the *Ruler* of France" *gave way* in the most material point to the remonstrances of America; and I have never yet read a Message of Mr. Madison, at the opening of a session of Congress, in which he did not complain of the conduct of France. The Americans abhor an alliance with France; and if they form such an alliance, it will have been occasioned by this war with us.—This charge of subserviency to Bonaparte has a thousand times been preferred against Mr. Madison, but never, as I have seen, once *proved*. It is, indeed, the charge which we have been in the habit of preferring against all those powers, who have been at war with us; Spain, Holland, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, and, though last, not least, Russia, as will be seen by a reference to Mr. Canning's answer to the propositions from Tilsit.——"Subserviency to the Ruler of France!"—We stop the American merchantmen upon the high seas; we take out many of their own native seamen; we force them on board of our men of war; we send them away to the East Indies, the West Indies, or the Mediterranian; we expose them to all the hardships of such a life and all the dangers of battle, in a war, in which they have no concern: all this we do, for we do not deny it—and, when, *after MANY YEARS of remonstrance*, the American government arms and sends forth its soldiers and sailors to compel us to desist, we accuse that government of "*subserviency to the Ruler of France*," who, whatever else he may have done, has not, as I have ever heard, given the Americans reason to complain of impressments from on board their ships. Many unjust acts he appears to have committed towards the Americans; but he has wisely abstained from impressments, which, as I have all along said, was the *only ground* upon which the people of America could have been prevailed upon to enter heartily into a war with any power: it is a popular ground; the war is the cause of the people; accordingly, we find the motto to the war is:—"*Liberty of the seas and seamen's rights*". I, therefore, regret exceedingly, that the "DECLARATION" styles America "a *willing instrument* and *abettor* of French tyranny." It is a heavy charge; it is one that will stick close to the memory of those who support the war; it will tend to inflame, rather than allay, their angry passions; and, of course, it will tend to kill all hopes of a speedy reconciliation.——As to what the "DECLARATION" is pleased to say about the "*common origin*" of the two nations, if of any weight, it might be urged, I suppose, with full as much propriety by the Americans *against our impressments*, as it is now urged against their resistance. I remember that it was urged with great force in favor of American submission to be taxed by an English Parliment; but, as the result showed, with as little effect as it possibly can be upon this occasion. There is one thing in this "*calling cousin*," as the saying is, that I do not much like,