REPORT OF FORTIFICATIONS.

Department of War,
12th of February, 1821.

SIR: In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th instant, directing "that the Secretary of War report to that House the progress which has been made by the Board of Engineers, in determining the sites and plans of fortifications of the coast of the United States; the sites which may have been selected; the estimates of the expense in completing the several works; the number of troops necessary to garrison them in peace, and in war; the progress made in erecting the fortifications; the advantages resulting from the system when completed, particularly in reducing the expense of defending the Atlantic frontiers;" I have the honor to enclose a report of the Board of Engineers, marked A, and a report of the Engineer Department, marked B, which give the information required by the resolution.

It may be proper to observe, that the projected fortifications have been distributed into three classes, according to their relative importance, and that it is determined to erect those of the first class, previous to the commencement of the second and third classes, with the exception of the works at Mobile Point and Dauphin Island. These works were commenced in preference to those projected at Bayou Bienvenue, and Fort St. Philip; for, although the latter are placed in the first class, it was not however deemed proper to commence with them, as they were much less extensive than the two former, and could be completed in a short time, should the state of our relations with other powers render it necessary.

The contractors for the works at the Rigolets were, by the arrangements with them, to have erected those contemplated at Chef Menteur, but so many impediments have been encountered, that it has been necessary for them to confine their operations wholly to the former.

I have the honor to be,
Your obedient servant,
J. C. CALHOUN.

Hon. JOHN W. TAYLOR,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

TO THE HON. SECRETARY OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT.

City of Washington, February 7, 1821.

SIR: The following summary of the operations of the Board of Engineers, called for by your order, is respectfully submitted.

The commission charged with reconnoitering the frontiers of the United States has completed the three most important sections of the maritime boundaries, viz: The coast of the gulf of Mexico, the coast between Cape Hatteras and Cape Cod, and the coast between Cape Cod and the river St. Croix. The coast between Cape Hatteras and Cape Fear has likewise been surveyed; and the only section which remains to be examined, to complete the reconnoissance of the coast, is South Carolina and Georgia.

The reports presented in 1818, 1819, 1820, and 1821, to the Hon. Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments, were accompanied by every necessary plan, table, &c. and embrace every naval and military consideration, both as to the attack, and as to the defence of the frontier, as to fixing the sites for the great naval depots, and as to protecting, by the general system of defence, the general system of internal navigation. We must refer to the details of these reports to show the importance of establishing a complete system for the protection of the frontiers, and the necessity of building this system upon principles harmonizing with the modern system of warfare. It will be seen, that most of the existing forts only defend single points, and satisfy only a few essential conditions; and that they have not been planned with a view to the defence of the frontiers, considered as one great and combined system, whose several parts should be connected and should mutually support each other. The navy yards (excepting that of Charlestown near Boston) have all been improperly placed: the conveniences for the erection of the necessary establishments having alone been taken into consideration, while all the other requisites for points so important, such as security against attack by sea or land, facility of receiving all kinds of building materials in time of war as well as in time of peace, vicinity to a place of rendezvous, have been overlooked.

A defensive system for the frontiers of the United States is therefore yet to be created; its bases are, first, a navy; second, fortifications; third, interior communications by land and water; and, fourth, a regular army and well organized militia: these means must all be combined so as to form a complete system.

The navy must, in the first place, be provided with proper establishments for construction and repair, harbors of rendezvous, stations, and ports of refuge. It is only by taking into view the general character, as well as the details, of the whole frontier, that we can fix on the most advantageous points for receiving these naval depots, harbors of rendezvous, stations, and ports of refuge.

On these considerations, Burwell's bay, in James river, and Charlestown near Boston, have been especially recommended by the commission, as the most proper sites for the great naval arsenals of the south and of the north.—Hampton roads and Boston roads as the chief rendezvous, and Naraganset bay as an indispensable accessary to Boston roads. (See reports of 1819 and 1820.)

It is also from an attentive consideration of the whole maritime frontier of the interior, and of the coastwise navigation, that Mobile bay on the Gulf of Mexico, St. Mary's in the Chesapeake, the Delaware, New York bay, Bayard's bay, New London, Marblehead, Portsmouth, Portland, the mouths of the Kennebeck and Penobscot, and Mount Desert bay, have been fixed upon as stations and ports of refuge; as necessary and essential to our merchant vessels as to our navy.

Smithville and Beaufort, N. Carolina; Annapolis and Baltimore, Md.; New Haven, Connecticut; Salem in Massachusetts; and Wiscasset in Maine; have likewise been examined with attention, with a view to secure them from attack by sea or land. (See reports of 1819, 1820 and 1821.)

St. Mary's river and Savannah in Georgia, Beaufort, Charleston and Georgetown in South Carolina, will be examined and surveyed in the course of this year.

After determining the general and connected system of naval depots, harbors of rendezvous, stations and ports of refuge, the commission in the next place traced the scheme of fortifications necessary to protect this system, and at the same time to guard the whole frontier against invasion. The forts projected by the commission for this purpose satisfy one or more of the following conditions:

1. To close important harbours to an enemy, and secure them to the navy of the country.
2. To deprive an enemy of strong positions, where, protected by his naval superiority, he might fix permanent quarters in our territory, maintain himself during the war, and keep the whole frontier in perpetual alarm.
3. To cover our great cities against attack.
4. To prevent, as much as possible, the great avenues of interior navigation from being blockaded by a naval force, at their entrance into the ocean.
6. To cover the coastwise and interior navigation, and give to our navy the means necessary for protecting this navigation.
6. To cover the great naval establishments.

A rapid review of the works which have been projected by the commission, will exhibit, with sufficient distinctness, the advantages which must result from their construction.

In Louisiana, the forts projected at the Turn of Plaquemines, at the Bayou Bienvenue, at the Chef Menteur, at the Rigolets, form altogether a system of defence, not only covering New Orleans, but preventing an enemy from taking and holding his position at the northern point of the Delta of the Mississippi, where, presenting a small front, easily fortified in a few days, and impossible to turn, he might defy all the forces of the west. Supposing even that he were expelled from it, he might in his retreat pillage and burn all the habitations, and carry off the slaves from both sides of the river for a length of 150 miles. This whole projected system of works will cost a little more than $1,000,000; a sum small indeed to avert such calamities, and which bears no sort of proportion to the effects which it will produce. The fortifications projected at the mouth of Mobile bay, prevent as far as practicable its blockade, secure the communication of the Tombigbee and Alabama with the ocean, as well as that which is proposed to connect these rivers with the Tennessee; protect also the communication between Mobile bay and Lake Pontchartrain by the interior channel, lying between the main and the chain of islands bounded by Cat Island to the west, and Dauphin Island to the east, and deprive an enemy of a station whence he might act either against New Orleans, or the establishments which the United States may form hereafter in Pensacola. At present, Fort Boyer, at Mobile Point, which could not hold out three days against a regular attack, and Fort St. Philip, which is much too small and weak to defend the Mississippi, are the only protection for Louisiana.

The forts which will be projected at St. Mary's river and Savannah, in Georgia, Beaufort, Charleston, and Georgetown, in South Carolina, will have for object to secure the communication between the sea and the interior, to prevent blockade of the rivers and harbors of these states, to secure naval stations, necessary in guarding the coasting trade, and to cover the great commercial cities against attack by land or sea.

The forts of Smithville and Beaufort, North Carolina, will have for object to close the only two important issues by which the interior of that state communicates with the ocean: they defend the access to the interior navigation, which, sooner or later, will be opened between the Chesapeake and Cape Fear river, and which, by means of canals, will secure in time of war the arrival of naval approvisionnements at the maritime depot of Burwell's Bay, while in time of peace it will give to the commerce of the country in general, and of North Carolina in particular, great facilities for avoiding the dangerous and difficult navigation of Albemarle and Pamptico sounds.

In the Chesapeake the projected works at the entrance of Hampton Roads, have for object to close this road against an enemy, and to secure it to the United States; to secure the interior navigation between the Chesapeake and the more southern states; to make sure of a naval place of arms, where the navy of the United States may protect the Chespeake, and the coasting trade; to cover the public docks, &c. at Norfolk, and those which may be established in James River; and to prevent an enemy from making a permanent establishment at Norfolk.

While on this subject we will observe, that an enemy might land in Lynnhaven Bay, and, in one day's march reach the narrow position which lies to the east of Suffolk: bounded, on one side, by the Dismal Swamp, and, on the other, by Bennett's creek, near the mouth of the Nancemond, this position cannot be turned, and may easily be fortified. An enemy might there defy all the forces of Virginia and North Carolina. Secure of a retreat as long as his fleet occupied Hampton Road, he would compel the United States to make the greatest possible sacrifices, both in men and money, before he could be driven out. But, if Hampton Road is fortified, he will only be able to anchor in the open road of Lynnhaven Bay: his march thence upon Suffolk may be turned by our forces crossing at Hampton Road, and he will, therefore, find it impossible to take permanent quarters in the country. The expense at which these results will be obtained, is $1,800,000: a trifling if compared with the magnitude of the advantages which will be procured, and the evils which will be averted.

At Baltimore the forts projected at Hawkins' Point and on the shoal of Soeller's Point, cover the harbor; & the last mentioned work will force an enemy to land, if he intends attacking the town, at a greater distance from it, and will thus prevent him from turning the defensive position on which our forces might take against him. The batteries of St. Mary's secure a good station to the vessels of war charged with guarding the Chesapeake; protect an anchorage accessible by vessels of the largest class; and, as do also the batteries at Annapolis, offer a safe asylum to merchant vessels which might find it impossible to reach Baltimore. St. Mary's is not at all defended, and Fort McHenry at Baltimore has no influence whatever over an attack by land & cannot even secure the city and harbor from bombardment.

In the Delaware, the fort on the Pea Patch Island, and the one on the Delaware shore opposite, defend the water passage as far below Philadelphia as localities will permit: they force an enemy to land 40 miles below the city to attack it by land, and thus afford time for the arrival of succors; they secure to the forces of the country successive defensible positions, where part may delay an enemy while part file upon his flanks, or cross the river in his rear, and cut him off from his fleet. At present, Fort Mifflin, seven miles below the city, is the only obstacle an enemy would encounter: he might, therefore, land very near the city, and attack it within a few hours of his landing. The two projected forts will also have the advantage of covering the canal destined to connect the Chesapeake with the Delaware, if the junction of the canal be, as in all probability it must be, to the north of the Pea Patch.

The projected works on the waters of the Hudson and East rivers have for object to cover the city of New York against an attack by land or sea; to protect its numerous shipping; to prevent, as much as possible, the blockade of that immense river, which will soon have added to the wealth of its own shores the productions of the boundless regions on the northern and western lakes; and to cover the interior navigation which is projected to connect the waters of the Delaware with those of the bay of New York, by a canal from the Rariton. The forts projected at the Narrows, and at the pass of Throgg's Neck on the East river, while they defend the entrances into the bay, force the enemy to land in the Sound at a great distance from the city, and place Brooklyn Height at the bottom of an interior curve of the frontier of which these works occupy the extremities, in rear of an enemy moving upon Brooklyn, and afford time, by their resistance, for the militia to assemble and march to the relief of the city; thus greatly diminishing the chances of success to the enterprise. The expense of these works will be about 1,800,000 dollars.

As to the forts projected for the East Bank and Middle Ground, they will complete the defence of the city, by depriving an enemy of the landing place in Gravesend Bay, the only spot on the south shore of Long Island where he can safely land to march on Brooklyn. They will also deprive him of the possibility of establishing himself on Staten Island; and thus reduce the points of attack to one in the Sound. Besides thus strengthening the defences of the city, they will prevent an enemy from anchoring in the outer harbor to blockade the Hudson, alarm the country, and intercept the interior communication by the Rariton.

The harbor of New York, in its present state, is scarcely at all defended against a sea attack, & the city is not at all defended against an attack by land. An invading enemy might reach the city within two or three days, either by the Sound or harbor, and, after accomplishing his object, would find his retreat secure.

The batteries projected for Newhaven protect that city against depredations and secure a port of refuge in the Sound to merchant vessels escaping from privateers. The existing batteries are too small to offer any resistance.

The forts at New London will secure to the largest vessels a safe and excellent anchorage at all seasons; as the Thames never freezes, they protect a good station, whence our navy can, at all times, keep good watch over the coasting merchant vessels, and especially, over the navigation of Long Island Sound.

The projected defences of Narraganset Bay will deprive an enemy of the possibility of occupying that excellent road-stead, and secure it to the United States.—The possession of this bay will be to us of inestimable advantage. It is the only one on the coast which vessels can enter with a N. W. wind, and, as the same winds serve for entering both New York and Boston harbors, (N. N. W. to S. S. W. round by the east) while Narraganset Bay is accessable with all winds, from N. W. to E. round by the W.; it follows, that, on this part of the coast, vessels may be certain of making a harbor with every wind of the compass, except the four points from N. W. to N. N. W. Narreganset Bay and Hampton Roads are also the only harbors from Cape Hatteras to Cape Cod, which are proper for naval rendezvous.—This Bay is besides a most important station for protecting the transit of vessels from the Vineyard into Long Island Sound.

If Narraganset bay was left in its existing state as to defence, an enemy would seize it without difficulty, and by the aid of his naval supremacy, form an establishment in Rhode Island for the war. For this purpose it would be sufficient for him to occupy the position of Tiverton Heights, opposite Howland's Ferry, which is of narrow front, easy to secure and impossible to turn. He might then defy all the forces of the eastern states; drive the United States to vast expense of blood and treasure; and while his troops would thus put in alarm and motion all the population of the east, feigned expeditions against New York, by Long Island Sound, would equally alarm that state and the neighboring ones; and if he merely contented himself with menacing the coast, it is difficult to calculate the expenses into which he would drive the government. The advantages which the United States will derive from the occupation of this bay, and those of which this occupation will deprive the enemy, seem to us of infinitely more importance than the sum of $1,600,000, which will be required to close and fortify it completely.

The forts projected to cover Boston will have for object to defend the channel at its junction with the ocean, to cover Nantasket road against an attack by sea, to render any attempt against the naval depot and arsenal at Charlestown and the city of Boston impracticable, and to secure and facilitate the sailing in and out o the fleets of the U. States.

The works projected for Plymouth, Provincetown, and Marblehead, will deprive an enemy who might attempt to blockade Boston of important anchorages; and whilst the occupation of these points will render a blockade of that port almost impossible, it will secure, at the same time, a refuge to our own vessels which may be prevented by contrary winds from entering Boston harbor. These works will also deprive an enemy of landing points whence he might march upon Boston and Charlestown, and thus secure these important positions against an attack by land.

The works projected at Salem protect that city and its commerce from the depredations of a hostile naval force, and deprive the land forces of an enemy of a landing place whence the whole country might be alarmed, and the naval depot of Charlestown be menaced.

The forts projected at Portsmouth and Portland secure to the Union these ports, important both to the commercial and naval interests of the country; they protect the sailing in and out of the ships destined to guard the coasting trade. The defence of these harbors by proper forts will enable the government to form, under their cover, victualling and repairing establishments, and thus convert these harbors into ports of refuge for the navy.

The works projected at the mouths of the Kennebeck, Sheepscut, and Penobscot, will secure the entrance of these rivers, protect the navy stationed on the coast to guard the coasting trade, and afford asylums to our privateers and merchant vessels when chased, and safe points which the privateers can keep watch upon, and act against the commerce of an enemy.

The forts to be erected for the defence of Mount Desart Bay will deprive an enemy of an important station whence he might menace and paralyze all the navigation of the coast of the state of Maine, and by which he would shorten the line of his operations against that of the coasts of New Hampshire and Massachusetts. These forts will secure to the United States a position from which will result the following advantages:

1st. A nearer and better point of departure for operations, in time of war, against the British establishments in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and against the commerce of those provinces.

2d. This position will protect, as far as the local circumstances of the country will allow it, the eastern extremity of the maritime frontiers of the Union, being that nearest the possessions of another power.

3d. It will secure a port of refuge for our navy and privateers in the vicinity of a much frequented cruizing ground.

(To be continued.)

FROM THE DEMOCRATIC PRESS.

AN AMERICAN FREEHOLDER,

TO THE

PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES,

AND THEIR FOREIGN FRIENDS, WHO ARE DISPOSED TO EMBARK IN AMERICAN MANUFACTURES.

On the growth of Manufactures without prohibitions or new forcing duties, which are left to the consideration of all other persons, and for all other times and places, uncensured and unapproved.

No. III.

The substitution of cotton, as a raw material, for wool, hemp, flax, silk and skins, is a matter of manifest importance to the growth and the steadiness of our manufactures. The writer of these papers pursued a course of publication upon this subject for a series of years, which was commenced when cotton table cloths, cotton towels, cotton shirting, cotton sheeting (except a few coarse India gurrahs) cotton blankets, cotton nankeens, of England, and other useful articles now made of cotton, were entirely unknown, and when there was little cotton hosiery, little cotton cloth of Europe and America, called calicoes, no ginghams, but of Asia, many silks, now substituted by cottons for gowns, shawls, handkerchiefs and other purposes, many more worsted stuffs, now substituted by dimities and other cotton goods, tapes of cotton, bobbins of cotton, laces of cotton, sewing thread of cotton for those of flax, silk, and hemp, cambric muslins for flaxen cambrics, and for pistol and flaxen lawns, cotton vesting and fancy goods for those of silk, cotton linings, and pocketing for those of linen. It is the great and real interest of our cotton manufacturers and planters to make, in their manufactories and families, all kinds of heavy strong cotton goods requiring much cotton, as substitutes for goods of flax, hemp, wool, silk and leather. It will introduce a great and constant home consumption of raw cotton to the great profit of the manufacturers and planters. Every woollen and other article should be closely scrutinized, and considered by the manufacturer for this purpose. Cotton blankets instead of woollen; cotton swanskins for woollen; cotton corduroys and thicksets; royal ribs and velvets for woollen cassimeres, plushes and demims; cotton sheetings for Irish, Scotch, Rouen, German and Russia sheetings; cotton drilling, such as the army wear, for Russia sheeting and Raven's duck; and drilling of hemp, cotton, negro cloth, or real Kendall cottons, for coarse woollen. "Kendall" makes, of the worst wool, what was formerly made of cotton in the negro and coloured people's countries. These examples will be sufficient to bring this interesting point, conceived to be of the utmost importance, under the consideration of the planters, farmers, manufacturers and consumers.—As the Lincolnshire or lowest class of English fleeces are sold, in a clean state, at 8½ pence sterling, about seventeen cents per pound; and no country but England has that wool for coarse goods, it is manifest that our cheapest quality of cotton will enable us in many instances to make cotton goods, to rival the goods made of that cheap kind of wool. We can dye these goods with the cheap and lasting colour made of "THE IRON LIQUOR" as it is called, which is prepared by clean old broken iron scraps or fragments of castings and wrought iron, steeped in the common ley of wood ashes, called the PYROLIGNEOUS ACID. The colour made is that of cinnamon or cassia, or Jesuits bark; a durable yellow. It costs nothing, being made of useless pieces of broken iron, corroded by the acid in the common ley of the wood ashes of our chimnies.

Our manufacturing has been first economical in the United States, and then more convenient and elegant. Thus do we really, steadily and considerably advance. Many people in America and G. Britain, however, made engagements from it A. D. 1812 to 1816 in the mixed specie and paper currency or medium of the two countries, which our manufacturers, following the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Crawford, state to have been $110,000,000, in one of the latter years, and in the next year probably more, which we will presume to have been 120,000,000 of dollars of specie and bank paper in 1817, in the United States. It is considered to be a general opinion, well examined and confirmed, that our proper gold, silver and copper coins in specie were then 15,000,000 of dollars; so that we had eight mixed nominal mediums for one real; and our manufacturers paid for labour, bought upon credit, built upon credit, and made goods upon credit, all payable in that mixed medium, which has been for some time reduced to one third of the sum and is since more reduced, and that declining. To make good and effective payments now in a currency or medium of THIRTY millions to fulfil engagements made when we had ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY millions of medium has ruined many, and embarrassed more experienced manufacturers, and various other descriptions of persons. No duty, which Congress could be reasonably expected to lay would have saved persons so involved.

If some understood the business of the manufactory, so as to make good commodities out of the least quantities of raw materials, ingredients, and labour, they did not understand the business of the counting house, the currency, and the banks. It is in a great degree, by such things, that manufacturers have been ruined, who should have paid only fair specie prices for what they bought, and who should have sold off their goods as they made them.—For cotton raw materials, rents, labour, machinery, provisions, cattle, and mill seats, have greatly fallen in price. Some have agreed to give 5, 10, and 15 times the ground rent which their adjoining neighbours paid since the revolutionary war. The state of Massachusetts sold the Gennesee country of New York (as large as present Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island) at about five cents and one half per acre in 1788; and Congress have sold an equal quantity of the medium quality of their lands at 30 to 35 times the price, besides 10 or 5 times the price which we deduct to pay Indian consideration and surveying charges.

Similar and equal errors have taken place in regard to building houses, manufactories, mills, warehouses, and ships, and as to furniture, equipage, apparel, plate, and other matters of household expense. It is peremptorily required of Congress, and of the state legislatures; of the President and the Governors, and their administrations, that laws and executive measures should be devised, enacted, and adopted, to annihilate the consequences of this mass of errors. We might as reasonably request, that the Mississippi and the Susquehannah should be made, *by law*, five fathoms deep from their mouths, to their fountains. We have a great and blessed country, and we and Great Britain, who has also made an eight fold mixed specie and paper capital of 800 millions of dollars, having alone among the civilized nations, systems of independent legislation and credit, have committed like excess in the use of that credit, and produced like disorders within. By the happy returns to prudence, which we have made, are making, and shall and *must* continue to make, and by the exercise of all the civil and moral virtues, our country will liquidate all its engagements, often no doubt by the painful, though necessary, lawful and moral change of the late and present depositaries of property. The trials to manufactures and general business, which we sustained in those necessary operations, and which we have yet to suffer on their remaining course and final consummation, like those arising from the revolution produced by the power loom abovementioned, could not have been prevented by any prudent duties, prohibitions, or legislative regulations.

A distinguished example of the progress of manufactures in the United States occurs in the perpetual operation of moulding, preparing, and making paper, after the manner pursued by Messrs. Gilpin, of Philadelphia, and Brandywine, in Delaware. This operation is so rapid, efficient, and productive of excellent paper for every purpose, that, with an adequate capital, a few works, on this plan, would be capable of producing paper enough for the Union, and *would infallibly overturn all the excellent old paper mills* which have been introduced into this country from the time of the first establishment by the father of our venerable philosopher, David Rittenhouse. The apprehensions, the injuries, and the trials of the whole body of the paper manufacturers of 1810 to 1815, occasioned by Messrs. Gilpin's recent establishment, and others similar to it, are not produced by Congress in any greater degree than those resulting to hand and feet loom weavers by the effective and wonderful operations of the power loom. The paper mills of the old construction worked up all the rags and other materials we have ever been able to collect at home and import from abroad. We might not, therefore, be able to increase the raw materials, which are wisely free of impost, by duties on paper, or by prohibitions, or by any means in the power of the legislature. Paper is a necessary material for several important arts, and for the whole circle of our instructors, and our men of public and private business. Its abundance and cheapness are great objects, and we have succeeded to make, in all its varieties, the whole quantity for which we can obtain the first materials.

Continuing to waive both the proposition and rejection of more duties and prohibitions in respect to foreign manufactures, it is our only purpose to contribute to the conviction of our own public mind, and of our foreign friends, that a very extensive, diversified, and valuable body of American manufactures is permanently and unalterably established, employing all the proper raw materials of the United States, of the country, on and west, east and north of the bay of Chesapeake, and of all the south of that bay, (except cotton alone,) and that not only are those domestic raw materials now steadily manufactured, but that we also as steadily work up large quantities of foreign raw materials of the same kinds, though they are generally subject to considerable or heavy duties, which injure or impede their manufacture in a much more considerable degree.

EAST FLORIDA.

Extract of a letter to a gentleman in Richmond from his friend in St. Augustine, dated April 5, 1821.

"I wrote to you a few days before I left Charleston, and intended to have written to you again on my arrival at this place—but I have postponed it until I could either see or learn more of the country of Florida. This town has been built a great many years, and bears evident marks of it, as it is completely in ruins. It is the seat of government, and consequently the residence of the Governor, Mr. Coppinger; who is a plain, civil, and, apparently, very friendly man. He seems to be very anxious to leave this place and return to Cuba, his native place, and the residence of his wife and family, from whom he has been separated several years: but he, and most of the Spaniards here, seem very much mortified at the thoughts of giving up a country which possesses a great deal of fine land, but from which they receive but little or no benefit—for there are not half a dozen Spanish settlements on this side the Cape.

"The town of St. Augustine can never be a place of any consequence, either for commerce or as a deposit for the productions of the country; for there is a most difficult and dangerous bar at the mouth of the river, which has not more than nine feet water at high tide, and the bar is said to shift with the winds—so that it can never be a port of entry for large vessels; and the poverty of the surrounding country for twenty miles, is such as to prevent any kind of produce being brought here.

"The lands on the St. Johns are said to be very fine; it lies about 35 miles to the northward of this place, & runs in a semi-circular form, being equi-distant from hence for many miles.—On this river are some settlements, and it is probable that the principal port of entry on this side the Cape will be near the mouth of this river, as it has more water than any other stream. The Musquito and Indian rivers, the one 60 and the other 90 miles to the south of this, are said likewise to have on them very fine lands, well adapted to sugar, and many persons think to coffee. But the indolence of the Spaniards is such that they have made no experiment of it.—But the finest part of the country lies to the west of this, and is called Alochua: it is said to be as rich as land can possibly be. It is, however, in possession of the Indians, who will not willingly give it up. They are much excited against the Spaniards, for having (as they say, and very justly,) sold them and their country; so that it is safer for an American to travel into the interior of the country than for a Spaniard—though it is by no means safe for either without an Indian guide, many of whom are constantly coming to this place. There are a vast number of large grants for land, embracing a great proportion of the best land in the country; but most of them are forfeited from non-compliance with the conditions of the original grants which generally required that they should be settled within a limited time. This will open the door for disputes to all the large grants. As soon as it is safe to travel in the country, I mean to take a tour through it.

"I shall remain here until the exchange of flags takes place. I did expect there would have been a great many negroes imported here before it was given up, but not one has arriven here except a few from the U. States.—Money appears to be scarce here, as in Virginia. Notwithstanding the ruinous condition of the houses here, they ask the most extravagant prices for them, and they rent proportionably high. There are a number of adventurers coming on here from Charleston and Savannah but no men of capital except one from Charleston, who has purchased a house in town and lands on the Musquito. The healthiness of this country may induce many persons from South Carolina and Georgia to retire here in the sickly season. The inhabitants appear much mortified that this long settled place is not to be continued the seat of Government. They are indeed deeply interested, as their town property will be worth very little. I wait with great impatience to see the American flag supplant the Spanish. I think it will be necessary to send a pretty strong force here at first, as well as to Pensicola; for the Indians are by no means reconciled to the exchange, and many of them are under an impression that the Americans intend to make slaves of them. There are a vast number of runaway negroes among them, who, probably from motives of policy, inculcate these opinions. The appointment of General Jackson, as Governor of Florida, has mortified the Spaniards, and struck terror in the Indians, who appear to be panic-struck at the bare mention of his name. I think it would be unsafe to purchase lands here, until they are sold by the authority of the United States."

Enquirer.

Extract of a letter from Havana, dated April 4th; to a gentleman in this city which, is entitled to full credit.—"On the 7th January last, the Spanish schooner Bella Dolores, when within a few leagues of Havana, having on board 350 slaves, was captured by the Corvette Admiral Brion, Commodore Jolie, formerly the Athenian of Baltimore. The crew of the Bella Dolores were all landed immediately, except one Spanish officer and four seamen. A few days after, they were joined by the brig Independence, Capt. Johnson, from Baltimore, manned entirely with Americans. These two vessels came off the port of Havana, on purpose to plunder, and to make their forces more respectable, they put two long 12 pounders, with an officer and 22 men, on board the Bella Dolores, and kept her cruising in company until the 31st January; when the young Spanish officer and the four seamen, who were prisoners on board, obtained arms, and suddenly rushed on the crew, determined to die or recapture their vessel, and after a most obstinate contest, in which seven of the privateersmen were killed, and four wounded, they fortunately succeeded—put the officer and the remaining privateersmen on board a neutral vessel, made all sail for Havana, the two privateers in chase, and fortunately got into harbor at 7, P. M. The Spanish officer has gained great praise for his good conduct." *N. Y. Gaz.*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 20, 1821.

Those who have communications to make to the patent Office are requested to address them *directly* to the Secretary of State, if they send them by the mail, or to pay the postage on such communications, if they prefer sending them in the same way to any one else at the seat of government.

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