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244
SUPREME COURT.
[Barren v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. ]
bankments and other artificial means, purposely adapted to
bend the course of the water to the wharf in question. These
streams becoming very full and violent in rains, carried down
with them from the hills and the soil over which they ran,
large masses of sand and earth, which they deposited along,
and widely in front of the wharf of the plaintiff. The alleged
consequence was, that the water was rendered so shallow that
it ceased to be useful for vessels of any important burthen,
lost its income, and became of little or no value as a wharf.
This injury was asserted to have been inflicted by a series of
ordinances of the corporation, between the years 1815 and
1821; and that the evil was progressive; and it was active and
increasing even at the institution of this suit in 1822.
At the trial of the cause in Baltimore county court, the
plaintiff gave evidence tending to prove the original and natu-
ral course of the streams, the various works of the corporation
from time to time to turn them in the direction of this wharf,
and the ruinous consequences of these measures to the interests
of the plaintiff. It was not asserted by the defendants that
any compensation for the injury was evef made or proffered;
but they justified under the authority they deduced from the
charter of the city, granted by the legislature of Maryland, and
under several acts of the legislature conferring powers on the
corporation in regard to the grading and paving of streets, the
regulation of the harbour and its waters, and to the health of
the city.
They also denied that the plaintiff had shown any cause of
action in the declaration, asserting that the injury complained
of was a matter, of public nuisance, and not of special or indi-
vidual grievance in the eye of the law. This latter ground
was taken in exception, and was also urged as a reason for a
motion in arrest of judgment. On all. point's, the decision of
Baltimore county court was against the defendants, and a ver-
dict, for four thousand five hundred dollars was rendered for the
plaiutiff. An appeal was taken to the court of appeals, which
reversed the judgment of Baltimore county court, and did not
remand the case to that court for a further trial. From this
judgment the defendant in the court of appeals, prosecuted a
writ of error to this court.
JANUARY TERM 1833.
245
[Itarron v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.]
The counsel for the plaintiff presented the following points:
The plaintiff in error will contend that apart from the legis-
lative sanctions of the state of Maryland and the acts of the
corporation of Baltimore, holding, out special encouragement
and protection to interests in wharves constructed on the shores
of the Patapsco river, and particularly of the wharf erected by
Craig and the plaintiff, Barron; the right and profit of wharfage,
and use of the • water at the wharf for the objects of naviga-
tion, was a vested interest and incorporeal hereditament, invio-
lable even by the state, except upon just compensation for the
privation; but the act of assembly and the ordinance of the city
are relied on as enforcing the claim to the undisturbed enjoy-
ment of the right.
This right was interfered with, and the benefit of this pro-
perty taken away from the plaintiff by the corporation, avow-
edly, as the defence showed, for public use; for an object of
public interest—the benefit more immediately of the commu-
nity of Baltimore, the individuals, part of the population of
Maryland, known by the corporate title of the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore. The " inhabitants" of Baltimore are
thus incorporated by the act of 1796, ch. 68. As a corporation
they are made liable to be sued, and authorized to sue, to acquire
and hold and dispose of property, and, within the scope of the
powers conferred by the charter, are allowed to pass ordinances
and legislative acts, which it is declared by the charter shall
have the same effect as acts of assembly, and be operative,
provided they be not repugnant to the laws of the state, or the
constitution of the state, or of the United States. The plaintiff
will contend, accordingly:
1. That the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, though
viewed even as a municipal corporation, is liable for tort and
actual misfeasance; and that it is a tort, and would be so even
in the state acting in her immediate sovereignty, to deprive a
citizen of his property, though for public uses, without indem-
nification: that regarding the corporation as acting with the
delegated power of the state, the act complained of is not the
less an actionable tort.
2. That this is the case of an authority exercised under a
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